2003 MAPLD International Conference
Reagan Reagan Building and International Trade Center
Washington, D.C.
September 9-11, 2003
Invited History Talk
Roger D. Launius
Division of Space History, National Air and Space Museum
Smithsonian Institution
Abstract
This paper will consider the space policy issues raised by the Columbia accident, with the first part relating to the history of the Space Shuttle (how we got to where we are and the numerous and radical design compromises that led us to the current partially reusable stage-and-a-half launcher). A second section will discuss shuttle failures in general (including Challenger and significant anomalies on missions in which loss of life did not occur). I then intend to follow this with an exploration of the causes of the Columbia accident and how the investigation has unfolded. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of policy implications for the future.
These will involve discussions of the following:
- In the next few months the nation's public policy community will have to consciously take a decision on the role of humans in space in the future. We could choose to end it altogether, but that is so unlikely as to be meaningless. We could choose to upgrade the current shuttle spaceflight technology and carried on as we have in the past. We could choose to move out with a totally new system. We could pursue an amalgam of these options, and we probably will.
- In a decision to continue flights by astronauts -- a relatively nuanced but interesting concern -- how will NASA go about defining a political consensus in favor of ensuring it and what compromises will be necessary to make it a reality?
- The choice of the technology to pursue for the future of human spaceflight is also important. Will it be ELV or RLV, for instance? The answers to these questions will have profound implications for the direction human spaceflight will take for the next 20-30 years.
- NASA has demonstrated the self-perception that it is a perfect place. This has led to a basic overconfidence -- some would call it arrogance although I think that too strong a term -- that all necessary knowledge and understanding resides within the institution. Gary Brewer phrased it this way in his article, "Perfect Places: NASA as an Idealized Institution": NASA envisions itself as "close to being the best organization human beings could create to accomplish selected goals [but] success reinforces lessons that eventually become obsolete or even harmful." Brewer suggests that the consequences of an organization viewing itself as a perfect place includes "righteousness, flawed decision making, self deception, introversion and a diminished curiosity about the world outside the perfect place." NASA leaders have demonstrated in the past a belief that the institution holds all knowledge, and it seems to be approaching the Columbia accident and the investigation in a similar manner. For instance, I have heard repeatedly from several NASA engineers in the months since the accident that NASA is the only organization that flies shuttles and no one else has the expertise to tell it what to do. This is a troubling mindset. So too is the dismissal of those advocating the ET foam strike as the cause of the accident as "foamologists." So too is the comment in July about the forthcoming CAIB report: "We will be called upon to explain things again and again to people who never seem to understand or appreciate, much less applaud our successes--but yet are capable of becoming instant experts when it comes to our failures and assigning blame."
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Last Revised: December 03, 2003
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