

How Software Errors Contribute to Satellite Failures - Challenges Facing the Risk Analysis Community

15 May 2003

SCSRA Annual Workshop


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We Have Been Going to Space for Over 40 Years Yet Our Reliability Record Remains Spotty

1st Year Catastrophic Failures And 3 Year Degradation - 483 Satellites -




Why Do Satellites Fail?

Unclassified U.S. Government Satellites, 1990–Present


Date	Program	Problem/Outcome	Engineering Mistake	Technology Surprise
04/90	Hubble	Severe mirror aberration due to a defect in the instrument used both in manufacturing and in QA.	X	
07/92	TSS-1	Deployment mechanism jammed by a bolt added after I&T.	X	
09/92	Mars Observer	Lost contact after repressurization of the propulsion system, probably due to oxidizer leak.		X
08/93	NOAA 13	An overly long screw shorted the battery charger	X	
10/93	Landsat F	Pyrovalve blowby ignited fuel.		X
01/94	Clementine	CPU froze due to data handling overload, allowing the thruster to continuously fire, depleting the fuel.		X
05/94	MSTI 2	Contact lost, probably due to micrometeoroid/debris impact, charging, or combinations thereof.		X
12/95	Skipper	Wiring for solar arrays configured in reverse due to drawing interpretation error. The battery was drained.	X	
02/96	TSS-1R	Severe arcing due to contamination within the insulation layers burned the tether.	X	
08/97	Lewis	A technically flawed GN&C design caused tumbling -not promptly arrested due to inadequate monitoring.	X	X
10/97	STEP-4	Damaged by launch vibration – ground test deemed inadequate	X	
10/98	STEX	Solar array ran too hot, causing solder joint fatigue and severe performance loss. Thermal analysis done on wrong configuration.	X	
12/98	MCO	Metric/English unit mix-up in flight software, coupled with vulnerable navigation scheme, caused probe loss.	X	
01/99	Mars Polar Lander	Touchdown sensors not protected from deployment shock, causing premature engine shutdown.	X	
03/99	WIRE	A starting transient from the pyro electronics controller prematurely ejected the telescope cover.		X
			Count	10
			Since 1995	7
				6
				2

Software Increasingly Matters

FSW SLOC Count



SW-Related Failures*



Over half of failures* between 1998 and 2000 involved software

FSW SLOC = Flight Software Source Lines of Codes

*: Includes Launch Vehicles

1962	Mariner 1 (Atlas)	1988	Phobos 1
1990	Intelsat 6 (Titan CT2)	1996	Cluster (Ariane 501)
1991	Orbcomm X	1998	SOHO
1994	Clementine	2000	STRV x 2
1999	Milstar 2-1	2000	ICO F1 (Sea Launch)
1999	MCO	2000	QuickBird (Cosmos 3M)
1999	Terriers		
1999	MPL		

NEAR and Phobos 2 not counted

Software Risks Are Underappreciated

- Small error can be fatal.
- Redundancy is ineffective.
- Risks do not necessarily decrease over time.
- More human factors are involved.

Challenges Facing the Risk Community:


- **Do risk analysts know how to model human errors?**
- **How should the system safety goal be met?**

Mars Polar Lander Failure

Systems Requirement stated:

“The touchdown sensors shall be sampled at 100-Hz. The sample process shall initiate to keep processor demand constant.

However, sensor data shall not begin until 12 m above the surface. “



This requirement did not flow down to S/W

One requirement, one statement

Mars Climate Orbiter Failure

- Thruster firing model, reused from a previous mission, was in metric. Thruster vendor supplied data in English units.
- In the previous mission, engineers correctly inserted a 4.45 factor to convert lb-force to Newton.
- A new thruster was used, and the vendor's new (English unit) equation was pasted into the model without the 4.45 factor:
 - Spec was overlooked
 - Original code had no warning remarks
 - Ground software viewed as non-critical
 - Truth table, manually computed, had the same mistake
 - Tests not thorough

Compounded by navigation inadequacy, mistake turned deadly

More Examples

Terriers

- A torque coil had to be installed with a phase opposite of that of the other two coils.
- Software, reused from another mission, was not changed.
- The satellite could not power up because its solar arrays were steered away from the Sun.

STRV

- Software spec did not incorporate a requirement to command status relays by pulse.
- The constant voltage burned out a relay coil, disabling both receivers.
- Flaw not found on ground because the test set software correctly drove the relays with pulsed signals.

Examples from the Launch World

Titan IVB-32/Centaur

- A parameter manually entered into Centaur's avionics database had a missing exponent (i.e., misplacing a decimal point).
- Milstar Flight II-1 was lost after the upper stage became out of control.

Ariane 501

- The flight software, reused from Ariane 4, encountered an “operand error” because the new Ariane 5 flew a different trajectory.
- Avionics design presumed faults as due to random hardware problems—best handled by an equipment swap.
- The same error shut down the backup controller, and the perfectly flying rocket.

Clementine and NEAR

- Clementine failed to rendezvous with an asteroid:
 - Available processor was inadequate.
 - Hardware watchdog not used.
 - An overflow error fired the thrusters and disabled the CPU:
 - * Software watchdog unable to function.
 - * All fuel depleted, ending mission.
- NEAR, another attempt, studied Clementine history.
 - An engine abort triggered massive anomalies.
 - Thrusters fired thousands of times.
 - Hardware watchdog limited fuel loss and saved the mission.

Lesson Learning Saves Missions

***Fools say that they learn by experience.
I prefer to profit by others' experience.***

Otto Bismarck